After _check confirms key still valid, code fell through to parse
the bf_kiosk_deleted JSON as a KioskBundle causing parse error.
Now returns None to skip bundle processing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Kiosk checks for stable firmware update before pairing. If available,
downloads + verifies + swaps binary and restarts. No auth needed.
Server: GET /api/firmware/public/check (stable channel, no auth)
GET /api/firmware/public/download/:id (rate-limited, no auth)
Kiosk: check_public() + apply_public() in firmware.rs. Called from
ui.rs worker thread before entering pairing loop. kiosk_app_version
made pub for access from ui.rs.
Also includes kiosk_id deserialization fix (Value instead of String).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Server returns kiosk_id as integer (not yet migrated to UUIDv7).
ClaimResp.kiosk_id changed from Option<String> to Option<Value>
to handle both integer and string. This was causing a panic on
deserialization after successful pairing.
Also simplified Coolify version arg.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Server returns {bf_kiosk_deleted: true} (200) instead of 401 when
kiosk key not found on bundle/heartbeat. Kiosk then confirms via
GET /api/kiosk/_check — only wipes config if _check also returns
401. Prevents proxy glitches from nuking valid kiosks.
Flow: bf_kiosk_deleted signal → confirm via _check → 401 = wipe,
200 = ignore (false alarm).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
After successful claim, kiosk_id from server response is stored
globally and included in all subsequent Axiom log entries for
kiosk identification.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces shared cluster_key for bundle encryption. Each kiosk gets a
unique 32-byte AES key generated at pairing time:
Server:
- confirmPairing generates randomBytes(32), stores encrypted with
server secret on kiosks.encrypt_key_encrypted column
- Delivers plaintext encrypt_key to kiosk in claim response (one-time)
- generateBundle prefers per-kiosk key over cluster_key for
encryptForCluster (same AES-256-GCM format, different key per kiosk)
Kiosk:
- ClaimResp gains encrypt_key field, stored encrypted at rest
- onvif_events prefers encrypt_key over cluster_key for decryption
- Backward compatible: old kiosks without encrypt_key still use
cluster_key (both delivered at pairing)
Security improvement: compromised SD card only exposes camera passwords
encrypted for THAT specific kiosk, not the entire fleet. Rotate by
deleting + re-pairing the compromised kiosk.
Full ONVIF event management overhaul:
DB: cameras gain event_source (auto|server|kiosk:<id>), event_sink
(auto|server|kiosk:<id>), and supported_event_topics (JSON array).
Server:
- GetEventProperties SOAP call in onvif.ts — queries camera for all
supported event topics (motion, ANPR, line crossing, etc.)
- POST /admin/cameras/:id/refresh-events route — runs GetEventProperties
via designated event source (kiosk WS relay or server direct)
- Camera edit form: event_source + event_sink dropdowns
- Camera detail: supported event topics table with refresh button
- Bundle includes event_source + event_sink so kiosk knows its role
Kiosk:
- onvif_events.rs respects event_source: only subscribes when "auto"
or "kiosk:<this_id>", skips when "server"
- Subscription status tracking: state (subscribing/active/failed),
last_event_at, error — reported in heartbeat for admin visibility
- BundleCamera gains event_source + event_sink fields
Auto logic for source: camera in kiosk's bundle → kiosk subscribes.
Auto logic for sink: TODO — same-subnet detection for WSBaseNotification.
Currently PullPoint only; push model is the next step.
Root cause: kiosk never stored cluster_key from pairing response.
Bundle ships onvif_password_encrypted (AES-256-GCM with cluster key).
decrypt_cluster was a stub returning None → empty password → WSSE auth
fails → CreatePullPoint rejected → no events ever.
Fix:
1. ClaimResp now includes cluster_key field
2. Stored encrypted at rest alongside kiosk_key (at_rest.rs)
3. Loaded at bundle render, passed to onvif_events::start()
4. decrypt_cluster implements full AES-256-GCM: parse v1.<iv>.<tag>.<ct>
format, base64url decode, decrypt with cluster key
Also: removed BF_ENABLE_ONVIF_EVENTS env gate — if camera is type=onvif
with onvif_host, subscribe. Gate was redundant with the type filter.
Also: bump Angie proxy_read_timeout to 600s on /api/admin/ for OS
bundle import (downloads ~1GB from GitHub, was timing out at 60s).
NOTE: existing paired kiosks won't have cluster_key stored. They need
to re-pair (delete + re-add) to receive it. New pairings get it
automatically.
Kiosk side (remote_debug.rs + ws_client.rs refactor):
- Journal streaming: server sends journal-start → kiosk spawns
journalctl -f, pipes lines back as journal-line messages via WS.
journal-stop kills the process. On-demand, not always-on.
- Terminal: server sends terminal-request → kiosk checks lockout +
firmware_channel == "dev" → generates 8-char code displayed on
screen as fullscreen overlay (NOT logged) → server relays admin's
code via terminal-auth → kiosk validates with constant-time compare
→ on success spawns bash, relays I/O as base64 terminal-data.
- Lockout: 3 failed codes per boot → lockout_count++. 3 lockouts
(9 total failures) → permanent (reflash only). Reboot resets
attempt counter, not lockout counter. Successful pairing resets all.
- ws_client.rs rewritten with split reader/writer + tokio::select!
for multiplexing incoming WS messages with outbound journal/terminal
data from sync threads.
Server side (coordinator-ws + routes-admin):
- New admin debug WS endpoint: /ws/admin/debug/:kioskId. Authenticated
via admin API key (query param) or session cookie. Relays messages
bidirectionally between admin browser ↔ kiosk.
- Admin pages: /admin/kiosks/:id/logs (journal viewer with start/
stop/clear) and /admin/kiosks/:id/terminal (code entry + terminal
area). Both open in new tabs from the kiosk detail page.
- Angie proxy config updated with /ws/admin/debug/ location block.
Security:
- Terminal only on dev channel
- Code displayed physically on screen, never logged or stored server-side
- Lockout: 3/boot, 3 lockouts = permanent, pairing resets
- Kiosk responds "locked" without specifying which lockout triggered
New module kiosk/src/at_rest.rs. Derives an AES-256-GCM key via HKDF
from a Pi-bound value:
1. /proc/device-tree/serial-number (Pi 5 firmware exposes it)
2. /proc/cpuinfo Serial line (older kernels)
3. /etc/machine-id (non-Pi dev fallback)
File format: "BFE1" magic || 12-byte random nonce || ciphertext+tag.
Atomic write via tempfile + rename so a crash mid-write can't leave a
half-encrypted file.
Wired into kiosk/src/server.rs at every file I/O touching sensitive
state:
- kiosk.key (bearer token to BF server)
- local.key (LAN-side API auth key)
- bundle.json (cached bundle with RTSP credentials in URL form)
Migration: read paths tolerate legacy plaintext (kiosks upgraded from a
pre-at_rest build) AND re-store as ciphertext on the first read. One-
shot upgrade — subsequent boots skip the migration write.
Threat model defended: SD card extraction. Attacker who pulls the card
can't decrypt without also having the same physical Pi (CPU serial is
hardware-bound). Doesn't defeat an attacker who has both — at that
point they ARE the kiosk. Bar is raised from "trivially extract every
camera password" to "must steal the device intact."
Not defended: TPM-style attestation, remote attestation, sealed boot.
Pi 5 has no TPM and we don't ship a secure-boot config.
Tests in-module: round-trip short bytes, round-trip JSON, legacy
plaintext passthrough.
ONVIF-imported cameras with rtsp_url but no camera_streams rows showed
"(no stream)" in the kiosk because the bundle fallback was gated to
type=rtsp only. Drop the type check + backfill existing rows so old
imports get a main stream row created.
feat(kiosk-mgmt): report hostname + all network interfaces
Behind Docker/Angie the server only saw the proxy bridge IP (172.31.0.2).
Kiosk now shells `ip -j addr show`, reports every non-loopback IPv4/v6
with CIDR, MAC, and operstate. Plus `hostname` for verifying that
managed-config applies landed. Admin UI renders interface list with
LAN IPs preferred for the copy-paste local-LAN endpoint.
feat(managed-config): auto-sync hostname from kiosk name
When admin renames a managed-image kiosk, slugify the name → DNS-safe
hostname and bump managed_config_version so the kiosk applies it on
next heartbeat. Empty form hostname now falls back to slug too, so
DHCP shows the friendly name.
feat(events): forward firmware + OS update outcomes as kiosk.log
Kiosk POSTs `/api/kiosk/event` with topic=kiosk.log on firmware-apply
attempts. Server-side firmware/os-update endpoints also insert into
event_log so admins can audit upgrades without correlating per-source.
Wire schema heartbeat gains reported_hostname + network_interfaces for
Rust import parity.
- server Dockerfile installs wget — bookworm-slim doesn't include it
by default, so the healthcheck CMD silently failed → Coolify marked
the container unhealthy.
- nodered healthcheck swapped to /nrdp/ (always 200 when runtime up)
via wget --spider; previous /nrdp/auth/login returned non-2xx when
adminAuth disabled.
- start_period bumped to 90s for nodered's flow load on smaller hosts.
- Kiosk discovery: cloud fallback now frame-eu.betterportal.net per
the managed-fleet endpoint.
Kiosk now exposes :18090 with two surfaces:
- GET /local/layout/:id?key=<kiosk_local_key>
Bookmark-friendly layout switch on this kiosk. Auth = kiosk-generated
local key (32 random bytes, hex, stored at <state_dir>/local.key).
- ANY /proxy/* — forwards to BF server with the request's Authorization
header preserved. Lets LAN clients reach a cloud-hosted BF server via
the kiosk's local socket; kiosk adds no auth of its own.
Heartbeat reports {local_key, local_port}; kiosks table grows
local_key/local_port/local_last_ip columns. Admin kiosk edit page now
shows the local URLs as a copy-paste block.
Override port: BF_KIOSK_LOCAL_PORT. Disable: BF_KIOSK_LOCAL_DISABLE=1.
Three related fixes:
1. Idle reverts (and any other kiosk-initiated layout switch) now POST
layout.changed to /api/kiosk/event. Previously the server only emitted
on admin-initiated switches, so Node-RED never saw the idle revert.
2. Server's /api/kiosk/event splays the payload to the top level when
the topic has a dedicated trigger node (layout.changed, kiosk.changed,
kiosk.status, display.power.changed, camera.changed). The trigger
nodes expect flat shapes matching the admin emit; the old wrapped
shape left every field undefined.
3. Auto-provisioning of bf-server-config in Node-RED: extend retry
window to ~5 min, log per attempt, force v2 API + full-deploy header
so credentials inline get accepted, surface response body on failure.
Kiosk heartbeat reports local display positions so the server can sync physical outputs without consuming global display indices.
Migrate displays.index away from global uniqueness because display numbering is only meaningful within a kiosk.
Bind native backend services and Node-RED to loopback so Angie remains the public auth boundary. Keep Docker on an internal compose network and stop kiosk fallback to a layout when display default is none.
Rust kiosk:
- web cells now use webkit6 WebView (load_uri)
- html cells use WebView.load_html (full HTML rendering)
- query_displays() reads /sys/class/drm/ for connected HDMI/DP outputs
- Heartbeat reports display geometry every 60s
Server:
- /api/kiosk/heartbeat accepts displays array
- Syncs kiosk-reported displays to display records
- Updates dimensions when changed, creates new displays for new ports
