BetterFrame/scripts/gen-rauc-signing-keys.sh
Mitchell R 084c119c44
feat(os-ota): build + sign + auto-import .raucb bundles in CI
Phase 1 of the OS OTA pipeline. Three pieces:

scripts/gen-rauc-signing-keys.sh — one-shot helper that issues an
Ed25519 X.509 CA + signing cert pair. Operator runs locally, commits
the CA cert (for embedding in kiosk image at /etc/rauc/keyring.pem),
stores the signing pair as GitHub Actions secrets
(BF_RAUC_SIGNING_CERT + BF_RAUC_SIGNING_KEY), keeps the CA private
key offline. RAUC verifies bundles against the keyring in the image.

deploy/rauc/build-bundle.sh — takes the pi-gen .img.xz, parses its
partition table with sfdisk, dd-extracts bootfs (vfat) + rootfs
(ext4) into a staging dir, renders manifest.raucm.in with version
+ git sha, runs `rauc bundle --cert= --key=` to produce a signed
.raucb. Verifies the bundle round-trips with `rauc info`.

build.yml gains two gated steps:
  - "Build RAUC bundle": runs only when both signing secrets are set,
    uploads .raucb as a release asset alongside the .img.xz.
  - "Auto-import OS bundle into BF server": POSTs the GH release asset
    URL to ${BF_AUTOIMPORT_URL}/api/admin/os/import so the server
    pulls + stores the bundle. Mirrors the kiosk-binary auto-import
    flow that already worked.

Compatibility string is `betterframe-rpi5-aarch64` (matches the value
already declared in deploy/rauc/system.conf). Channel passed through
from inputs (dev for master pushes, stable/beta for tags).

What's NOT in this commit:
  - Pi image A/B partition layout (custom genimage / pi-gen patch)
  - rauc package install + keyring drop in pi-gen stage
  - Kiosk-side os_update.rs Rust consumer that polls /api/kiosk/os/check
  - Admin UI for releases + rollouts

A bundle built today reaches /api/admin/os/import on the server but
isn't installable yet — kiosks have no consumer and no A/B layout.
That's the next 3 phases. Bundle production needs to be solid first
so the kiosk side can be tested against real artifacts.
2026-05-21 10:44:24 +02:00

59 lines
2.3 KiB
Bash
Executable file

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Generate the RAUC signing-cert PAIR used to sign OS bundles. Run ONCE per
# deployment; ALL kiosks built afterward must embed the matching CA cert
# in /etc/rauc/keyring.pem to accept bundles signed with this key.
#
# Outputs (written to ./rauc-signing/, .gitignored):
# ca-cert.pem — embed in kiosk image at /etc/rauc/keyring.pem
# ca-key.pem — KEEP OFFLINE. Only used to issue new signing certs.
# signing-cert.pem — committed to GitHub Actions secret BF_RAUC_SIGNING_CERT
# signing-key.pem — committed to GitHub Actions secret BF_RAUC_SIGNING_KEY
#
# RAUC accepts any OpenSSL-supported key inside an X.509 cert. We use
# Ed25519 because the cert chain stays small and verification is fast on
# the Pi. CA cert is self-signed; signing cert is issued by the CA. If
# the signing cert is ever leaked, revoke by rotating it under the same
# CA — kiosks don't need a re-flash, only a CRL update (future work).
set -euo pipefail
OUT_DIR="${1:-./rauc-signing}"
mkdir -p "$OUT_DIR"
cd "$OUT_DIR"
if [ -f ca-cert.pem ]; then
echo "refusing to overwrite existing keys at $OUT_DIR — delete first if intentional"
exit 1
fi
echo "==> Generating CA (Ed25519, 10 year validity)"
openssl genpkey -algorithm ED25519 -out ca-key.pem
openssl req -new -x509 -days 3650 -key ca-key.pem \
-subj "/CN=BetterFrame RAUC CA" -out ca-cert.pem
echo "==> Generating signing cert (Ed25519, 2 year validity)"
openssl genpkey -algorithm ED25519 -out signing-key.pem
openssl req -new -key signing-key.pem \
-subj "/CN=BetterFrame RAUC Signing" -out signing.csr
openssl x509 -req -in signing.csr -CA ca-cert.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \
-CAcreateserial -days 730 -out signing-cert.pem
rm -f signing.csr ca-cert.srl
chmod 600 ca-key.pem signing-key.pem
cat <<EOF
==> Done. Next steps:
1. Embed CA cert in the image at /etc/rauc/keyring.pem
(commit ca-cert.pem to repo; pi-gen stage will install it).
2. Set GitHub Actions secrets (Settings → Secrets → Actions):
BF_RAUC_SIGNING_CERT = $(realpath signing-cert.pem) contents
BF_RAUC_SIGNING_KEY = $(realpath signing-key.pem) contents
3. STORE ca-key.pem OFFLINE. It's used only to issue replacement signing
certs if the live signing key is rotated. Treat like a root password.
Files:
$(ls -la)
EOF